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COMMENTS
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA &
U.S. OCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTCE: ARE WE COMPLYING
WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW?
I. INTRODUCTION
[T]he health of the planet depends on the health of the
oceans. Even if we were to focus only on the marine environ-
ment off our own coasts, it would be impossible or extremely
expensive to protect [the ocean environment] without active and
consistent regulation by other governments both near and far.'
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS")2 became international law on November 16, 1994,'
one year after the sixtieth signatory ratified the treaty.4  World
delegates, recognizing their interdependence in the global marine
environment, joined together at the convention determined to
create a new "legal order" designed to protect and preserve the
marine environment for future generations.
As international law, UNCLOS imposes an obligation on
nation-states to adopt, implement, and enforce national legislation
to protect the world marine environment.' In addition, nations
must work together internationally to achieve that same goal.
When signing an Agreement that modified Part XI of UNCLOS
in July of 1994,6 the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,
1. Bernard H. Oxman, United States Interests in the Law of the Sea Convention, 88
AM. J. INT'L L. 167, 169 (1994).
,- 2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.62/422, reprinted in THE LAW OF THE SEA: OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA wrrH ANNEXES AND INDEX, U.N. Sales
No. E.83V.5 (1983) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
3. U.N. Amends Seabed Law, WASH. POST, July 29, 1994, at A28.
4. Id
5. Moira L. McConnell & Edgar Gold, The Modem Law of the Sea: Framework for
the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment?, 23 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
83,103 (1991).
6. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 101st
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Madeline Albright, announced the U.S. intent to seek congressio-
nal ratification of the treaty.7 If Congress ratifies the treaty,8 the
United States will become a nation-state bound by the terms of the
treaty as a whole.9
UNCLOS remains the "strongest comprehensive global
environmental treaty" ever negotiated.' °  Basic obligations
established in the treaty require nation-states not only to enact
domestic legislation, but also to cooperate through multilateral or
bilateral arrangements to protect and preserve the global marine
environment.1' These obligations include a duty to minimize and
control pollution in the oceans, to manage fisheries in order to
avoid over-exploitation, and to protect endangered species from
extinction. 2 The overall UNCLOS mandate is for nations to
consider the global effect of their activities on the marine habitat
and ecosystems and to tailor national policies to minimize any
adversities.
In 1982, rather than signing UNCLOS and binding the United
States by its mandate, President Reagan announced a new "United
States Ocean Policy."13  This policy purported to parallel the
plen. mtg., Annex, Agenda Item 36, U.N. Doc. AIRES/4&263/Annex (1994), reprinted in
33 I.L.M. 1309, Annex at 1313 (1994) [hereinafter Agreement].
7. Creature From the Deep, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 10, 1994, at 14A; Rebecca J.
Fowler, Law of the Sea: An Odyssey to U.S. Acceptance, WASH. POST, July 29,1994, at A3.
8. Even if Congress declines to ratify UNCLOS, which is possible given the strong
resistance of the new Republican majority, commentators have argued that the substantive
provisions of UNCLOS still may bind the United States because these provisions now
reflect customary international law. Martin H. Belsky, The Ecosystem Model Mandate for
a Comprehensive United States Ocean Policy and Law of the Sea, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
417, 470 (1989).
9. Since President Reagan refused to sign UNCLOS at the close of the convention
in 1982, the United States has been accused of "picking and choosing" the provisions of
the treaty favorable to the United States while ignoring those not favorable to the United
States. David A. Colson, The United States, The Law of the Sea, and The Pacific, in
CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION 36, 44 (Jon M. Van Dyke ed., 1984) (hereinafter CONSENSUS AND
CONFRONTATION). Other states, however, intended UNCLOS to create an agreement that
would operate as a complete package, made up of compromises by which both developed
and developing states must abide. Hasjim Djalal, The Effects of the Law of the Sea
Convention on the Norms that Now Govern Ocean Activities, in CONSENSUS AND
CONFRONTATION, supra, at 50, 51-52.
10. Oxman, supra note 1, at 169.
11. Belsky, supra note 8, at 462.
12. Id
13. See Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983), 3 C.F.R. 5030 (1983)
reprinted in 22 IL.M. 465 (1983); Statement by President on United States Ocean Policy,
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provisions of UNCLOS, without adopting the treaty obligations as
a whole. The U.S. plan declared an intent to cooperate with
international organizations to develop "uniform international
measures" that protect the marine environment. 4 In fact, the
United States has participated in several bilateral negotiations and
enacted many domestic environmental regulations addressing
certain marine environment issues. 5 Unfortunately, the U.S.
approach toward problems seriously threatening the environment
has been remedial rather than preventive.16 One commentator
notes that, "with a few exceptions, these laws reflected a 'use-by-
use,' 'issue-by-issue,' and 'pollutant-by-pollutant' approach to
oceans policy.' 17 Although in theory these measures may exceed
specific obligations set forth by UNCLOS, the United States'
ocean environmental policy is essentially a collection of ad hoc
agreements and legislation that, as applied, fall far short of the
mandate.
In the long run, both the United States and UNCLOS seek to
provide global comprehensive environmental guidelines protecting
and preserving the marine environment. U.S. methods to achieve
that goal, however, are self-centered and burdensome rather than
streamlined and internationally cooperative as envisioned by
UNCLOS.' The United States tends to impose its policies
unilaterally on other states rather than to encourage negotiation
and cooperation among states in working toward a common
goal. 9 As a result, application of U.S. domestic regulations and
19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 383 (Mar. 10, 1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 464 (1983).
14. Id.
15. George D. Haimbaugh, Impact of the Reagan Administration on the Law of the
Sea, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 151, 193-99 (1989).
16. McConnell & Gold, supra note 5, at 99.
17. Belsky, supra note 8, at 430.
18. UNCLOS "requires that States, when implementing the established standards,
harmonize their legislation and practices both regionally and through international
organizations and diplomatic conferences, globally." McConnell & Gold, supra note 5, at
92.
19. David M. Driesen, The Congressional Role in International Environmental Law and
Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 19 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 287, 301-02
(1991). For example, several domestic statutes enacted to protect the marine environment
expressly provide for imposing embargoes on countries not complying with U.S.
environmental laws. An embargo may be triggered under such a statute regardless of
whether the activity violates or satisfies the foreign country's domestic laws, any inter-
national agreement, or customary international law. Richard J. McLaughlin, UNCLOS
and the Demise of the United States' Use of Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea
Turtles, Whales, and Other International Marine Living Resources, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 8
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internationally negotiated agreements falls short of the comprehen-
sive national policy envisioned by UNCLOS. Additionally, such
application may well violate UNCLOS in failing to establish a
comprehensive international policy that espouses cooperation with
other nation-states.
This Comment calls for a change in the U.S. approach to its
ocean environmental policy. Part II of this Comment examines
the goals expressed by UNCLOS during the initial convention, as
well as the substantive role of the United States in defining those
goals. Part III reviews specific provisions of UNCLOS that
mandate a global plan to protect and preserve marine resources,
and recommends that all states adopt this plan. Part IV provides
an overview of U.S. environmental legislation concerning marine
resources and illustrates gaps resulting from ad hoc regulation and
from the hyperextension of U.S. policy into foreign states'
sovereign territories. Part V compares the UNCLOS mandate
with current U.S. practices, noting specifically the shortcomings
and areas of tension. Part VI of this Comment concludes that, in
order to comply with international law, the United States must
enact a comprehensive national plan to preserve marine resources.
II. THE U.S. ROLE IN UNCLOS III
The original United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea began in Geneva in 1958 in response to growing international
pressure to establish uniformity in maritime laws and rights of
passage.' UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II, two years later, both
resulted in international consensus on some issues, but left many
issues unresolved.
UNCLOS III convened in 1973 to attempt to resolve those
issues still in dispute.21 World delegates from developing and
developed states attended the Conference determined to agree to
a "comprehensive constitution for the oceans."'  UNCLOS III
lasted nine years. One hundred fifty-seven countries participated
(1994).
20. Captain George V. Galdorisi & Commander James G. Stavridis, United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea: Time for a U.S. Reevaluation?, 40 NAVAL L. REv. 229,
231 (1992).
21. Id
22. R.P. Anand, Odd Man Out: The United States and the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 9, at 73.
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in the negotiations and eleven delegations attended as obser-
vers.2 At the United States' insistence, the participants did not
vote on the provisions until the end of the convention,.4 at which
time 130 delegations accepted UNCLOS as a complete package.'
The United States, as one of the most powerful states
attending UNCLOS III, played an instrumental role in setting the
goals and policies of the agreement.26 The world was shocked,
therefore, when the United States was not one of the 119 delega-
tions who accepted UNCLOS when it opened for signature in
1982.27 The United States, under newly elected President
Reagan, disagreed with the seabed mining provisions calling for
shared technology and complex licensing procedures contained in
Part XI of UNCLOS and, thus, refused to sign.'
Shortly after the close of the convention, however, President
Reagan announced the new United States Ocean Policy ("Ocean
Policy"). This Ocean Policy followed President Reagan's overall
philosophy of reducing federal involvement in the private sector
and leaving control over local issues in the hands of the state and
local governing bodies.29 For the oceans, this meant that "ocean
resources were to be exploited; developers to be left alone and
allowed to develop; and protective measures only taken upon
concrete proof of real and present injury., 30  The Ocean Policy
23. Id. at 74.
24. Id
25. Because UNCLOS represented a culmination of compromises among the partici-
pants, delegates had to accept it in its entirety. "It is therefore not possible for states to
pick what they like and disregard what they do not like. In international law, as in
domestic law, rights and duties go hand in hand." UNCLOS, supra note 2, at xxxvi
(statement by the President of the Convention, Tommy T.B. Koh). Thus, international law
forbids States to take advantage of rights under UNCLOS while ignoring the correspond-
ing duties. Id.
26. "The present position of the United States Government towards this convention
is, therefore, inexplicable in the light of its history, in [the] light of its specific law of the
sea interests and in the light of the leading role which it has played in negotiating the
many compromises which have made this treaty possible." Id at xxxv.
27. Galdorisi & Stavridis, supra note 20, at 230.
28. Colson, supra note 9, at 39. At the time of the convention, the United States was
convinced that technological capability for mining minerals from the deep seabed was
imminent. The United States objected to the provisions that required that seabed
technology be shared, set production limits on seabed mining and set high fees for
licensing mining companies. Rebecca J. Fowler, Law of the Sea: An Odyssey to US.
Acceptance, WASH. POST, July 29, 1994, at A3.
29. Belsky, supra note 8, at 432.
30. Id
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proclaimed a new U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") of 200-
nautical miles and unilaterally accepted many of the provisions of
UNCLOS as binding on both the United States and all other
states.
31
President Reagan's announcement fostered international
controversy because the policy purported to use UNCLOS
provisions, but not UNCLOS itself, as a guide for developing U.S.
marine laws. President Reagan claimed he could do so without
adopting UNCLOS because, with the exception of provisions
opposed by the United States (e.g., the seabed mining provisions),
UNCLOS merely codified customary international law.32  Presi-
dent Reagan also contended that the rejected provisions did not
codify customary international law but revised existing interna-
tional law. The United States thus seemed to "pick and choose"
desirable portions of international law, and ignored the rest.33
Members of UNCLOS strongly criticized the U.S. position because
UNCLOS, in its final version, represented a compromise on most
issues among all the participating states.'
31. Carol Elizabeth Remy, U.S. Territorial Sea Extension: Jurisdiction and International
Environmental Protection, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1208, 1218 (1992/1993). President
Reagan noted that UNCLOS contained provisions regarding the oceans that "confirm
existing maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interests of all states." Marian
Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Law
of the Sea (U.S. Diges4 Ch. 7, S1) United States Ocean Policy, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 619
(1983) (emphasis added). The new Ocean Policy would "promote and protect United
States oceans interests 'in a manner consistent with those fair and balanced results in the
Convention and [with] international law."' Id President Reagan then announced the
creation of a 200-nautical mile EEZ for the United States and that the United States
intended to "act in accordance with [UNCLOS] ... relating to traditional uses of the
oceans-such as navigation and overflight." Id at 620. In making this statement, President
Reagan seemed to acknowledge that UNCLOS, in fact, was creating new international law
but, because of the seabed mining provisions, the United States did not want to comply
with the entire treaty.
32. No other country originally viewed the Law of the Sea as codifying international
law, but rather as a document created as a substitute for international law. UNCLOS was
convened to provide an alternative to international law that had been evolving in such a
way as to cause increasing dispute over extensions of national jurisdictions. "What makes
this so ironical [sic] is that the purpose of the United States in having a Law of the Sea
Conference was to end customary international law .... There was not to be any more
development of the law of the sea by custom, strange as that sounds." Comment by
William Burke During Discussion on Customary International Law and the Law of the Sea
Convention, in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 9, at 169, 170 (emphasis
added).
33. Djalal, supra note 9, at 52.
34. "The argument that, except for Part XI, the Convention codifies customary law
or reflects existing international practice is factually incorrect and legally insupportable."
904
UNCLOS & U.S. Ocean Practice
In the early 1990s, amid voluminous criticism of the United
States' showing of bad faith in rejecting UNCLOS, and "picking
and choosing" in violation of the terms of the agreement,35 the
United States agreed to revisit the prospect of becoming a
signatory to the treaty.36 The United States held firm on objec-
tions to the seabed mining provisions and insisted they be
modified.37 In order to address objections to the seabed mining
provisions by the United States and other developed countries, the
United Nations Secretary-General began a series of informal
discussions with representatives from twenty-five states. 3  This
meeting produced a supplemental agreement that modified seabed
provisions by making them more market-oriented and, thus,
acceptable to the United States.
39
The United States' decision to sign UNCLOS was due in part
to the revised seabed mining provisions and in part to the prospect
of losing worldwide influence if UNCLOS became international
law without U.S. participation.' UNCLOS received its sixtieth
ratification in November 1993, and UNCLOS became international
law effective November 1994,41 without the United States' formal
participation.
III. THE UNCLOS MANDATE
States came together at UNCLOS to recognize their inter-
dependence in the marine environment. That awareness is evident
in the resulting agreement for marine resource protection and
preservation. The participating states created a "constitution for
UNCLOS, supra note 2, at xxxiv (statement by the President of the Convention, Tommy
T.B. Koh). Each state received concessions in some areas in return for their own
concessions in others. Id.
35. Comment by Tommy Koh During Discussion, in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTA-
TION, supra note 9, at 57, 60.
36. Jonathan I. Charney, The Marine Environment and the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 28 INT'L LAW. 879, 880 n.3 (1994).
37. Id. at 880.
38. David D. Newsom, U.S. Senate Should Ratify The Law of The Sea Treaty,
CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, July 13, 1994, at 19.
39. Id. The modification kept a U.N. based licensing system for companies planning
to mine the seabed, but it reduced the fees imposed on governments and firms obtaining
licenses and presumably lessened the highly disputed technology sharing requirements
among countries. U.N. Amends Seabed Law, WASH. POST, July 29, 1994, at A28. See
Agreement, supra note 6.
40. Anand, supra note 22, at 118, 122.
41. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 308.
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the oceans," recognizing the concept of "the ocean as a resource
that is exhaustible and finite, and ocean usage as a resource
management question--one State's use or abuse negatively
affecting another State's use of the resource." 42
A. The Scope of UNCLOS
The concept of a "legal order" as envisioned in the UNCLOS
preamble reflects a balancing of conflicting interests in order to
achieve a common goal:
Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this
Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a
legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate interna-
tional communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the
seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their
resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the
study, protection and preservation of the marine environment.43
UNCLOS' "complete package" resulted from compromises among
states determined to harmonize each state's sovereign right to
exploit natural ocean resources with the global need to protect and
preserve those same resources for future generations. As a
package, UNCLOS sets forth rights and obligations of nation-states
designed to achieve this goal.
UNCLOS provides a global directive in which nation-states
recognize an "obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment."" To comply with that obligation, each state has
the exclusive right to oversee activities in its own coastal areas,
within a twelve-mile territorial sea, and within its 200-nautical mile
EEZ.45 Further, each state controls its nationals' activities on the
high seas and in foreign territory. States "are individually and col-
lectively responsible for their ocean space, and, with other nations,
responsible for all the world's seas. '' 6
42. McConnell & Gold, supra note 5, at 84-85.
43. UNCLOS, supra note 2, pmbl. (emphasis added).
44. Id. art. 192 (emphasis added).
45. UNCLOS redrew the boundary lines of coastal state control. It extended the
territorial sea, where a state exercises sovereign control, from three to twelve nautical
miles, limited only by the right of innocent passage. Id. arts. 3-33. In addition, UNCLOS
created an EEZ extending 200-nautical miles out from the territorial sea. A state's rights
and obligations in the EEZ are sovereign as to "exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources," but it must allow free access to geographically disad-
vantaged and landlocked states nearby. Id. arts. 55-75.
46. Belsky, supra note 8, at 461.
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B. States' Individual Obligations
UNCLOS recognizes a state's sovereign interest in commercial
activities in the oceans but dictates that the interest is secondary
to the obligation to protect marine resources. Article 193 declares
that "[sitates have the sovereign right to exploit their natural
resources pursuant to their environmental policies and in accor-
dance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environ-
ment."'47 This language of "obligation" and "duty" illustrates the
importance placed on conserving marine resources throughout
UNCLOS.
UNCLOS requires states to incorporate its provisions into
domestic law on a regional basis and into cooperative agreements
with other states on a global basis. Article 61, titled "Conservation
of the Living Resources," requires that each state "shall determine
the allowable catch of the living resources in its [EEZ] . .. [and]
shall ensure through proper conservation and management
measures that the maintenance of Jthose resources] ... is not
endangered by over-exploitation." To achieve these ends,
coastal states must cooperate as necessary with appropriate
international organizations.49
C. Goals of Mandated Legislation and Agreements
Fishery conservation measures mandated in Article 61 must
provide for maintenance or restoration of species so those species
can sustain the maximum yield over time." More importantly,
conservation measures must take into account interdependence of
species and species dependent upon, or associated with, the
harvested species "with a view to maintaining or restoring
populations ... above levels at which their reproduction may
become seriously threatened."'" One example of such mandated
conservation would be to require "coastal states to consider
consequences such as the mortality of marine mammals in purse
47. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 193 (emphasis added).
48. Id. art. 61 (emphasis added).
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id
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seine [net] fishing operations for tuna, and the drowning of sea
turtles by shrimp nets." 2
Foreign nationals fishing in a coastal state's EEZ must comply
with the zone's conservation measures.5 3  Furthermore, coastal
states and other states "shall cooperate ... with a view to ensuring
conservation" and efficient management of marine mammals,
5 4
highly migratory species,55  anadromous stocks, 6  and
catadromous species.
7
UNCLOS has enacted mandates similar to those in Articles
61 through 67 for the high seas. Article 117 establishes the "duty
of States to adopt with respect to their nationals measures for the
conservation of the living resources of the high seas. 58  Article
118 requires "cooperation of States in the conservation and
management of living resources" on the high seas. 9 Article 119
mandates "conservation of the living resources of the high seas,"0
and Article 120 commands protection of marine mammals.6
52. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 31. Tuna and dolphins are examples of species
"associated with" one another. Tuna fishermen are aware of this association, and they
actively seek out herds of dolphin as a locator for tuna. When they spot a herd, the
fishermen set out purse seine nets. Purse seines are large nets used to harvest tuna. Two
boats set them around the dolphins and arrange them so that the ends are closed at the
bottom, thereby trapping them inside. Tuna travel close beneath the dolphins and are thus
harvested; however, dolphins consequently are trapped in the nets with the tuna. They
become entangled in the nets and drown. Alan S. Rafterman, Chicken of the Sea: GATT
Restrictions on United States Environmental Measures Designed to Protect Marine Mam-
mals, 3 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 81, 82 n.11 (1991). In a similar manner, large sea
turtles become trapped and drown in shrimp trawl nets.
53. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 62. "Nationals of other States fishing in the [EEZ]
shall comply with the conservation measures and with the other terms and conditions
established in the laws and regulations of the coastal State." Id.
54. Id art. 65.
55. Id. art. 64 and Annex 1. "The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish
in the region for the highly migratory species ... shall co-operate directly or through
appropriate international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and
promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the region."
Id
56. Id. art. 66. "Enforcement of regulations regarding anadromous stocks beyond the
[EEZ] shall be by agreement between the State of origin and the other States concerned."
Id art. 66.3(d).
57. Id art. 67. "In cases where catadromous fish migrate through the [EEZ] of another
State .... the management, including harvesting, of such fish shall be regulated between
the State [of origin] and the other State concerned." Id
58. Id art. 117.
59. Id art. 118.
60. Id art. 119.
61. Id art. 120.
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Finally, UNCLOS requires that states take all measures
"necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment from any source ... [and] to protect and preserve
rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted,
threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine
life."62 Thus, viewed as a complete package, UNCLOS requires
states to initiate comprehensive national and international policies
for marine resource protection and preservation.
D. States' Global Obligation to Cooperate
The obligatory language used in UNCLOS demonstrates the
overwhelming importance of marine resource protection and
preservation to the international community. Thus, if "a State
breach[es] its obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment [it is] ... in breach of international law."63 Article
235 specifically addresses a state's liability if the state breaches its
responsibility to the marine environment.(' In short, UNCLOS
creates mandatory minimum guidelines for nation-states to follow
in setting their ocean policies. These minimum guidelines call for
a comprehensive national policy and cooperation among states
internationally to protect marine resources.
The mandatory minimum guidelines apply to domestic
regulations and to bilateral and multilateral negotiations, as well
as to nationals' activities on the high seas. The measures taken by
states must comply with their general obligation to "protect and
preserve the marine environment."' Thus, states must consider
all relevant environmental factors in their resource management
assessments and decisions:
They are to take such measures as are necessary to preserve
ecosystems and the habitat of marine life. Such measures shall
include environmental assessment of risks and monitoring of
risks and effects. Such assessment and monitoring is to be done
directly by each nation-state and indirectly and cooperatively
through international organizations.'
62. 1d art. 194.
63. McConnell & Gold, supra note 5, at 89.
64. "States are responsible for the fulfillment of their international obligations con-
cerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment. They shall be liable
in accordance with international law." UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 235.
65. Id art. 192.
66. Belsky, supra note 8, at 467.
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States must enact domestic legislation and enter cooperative
agreements designed to implement the following obligations: (1)
conserving living resources by preventing over-exploitation of
species and by considering the effects on "species associated with
or dependent upon harvested species";67 (2) cooperating with one
another to ensure the conservation of highly migratory species;'
and (3) protecting and conserving marine mammals and, "in the
case of cetaceans ... work[ing] through the appropriate interna-
tional organizations for their conservation, management and
study. "
69
In sum, the obligation to cooperate with other states and
international organizations includes:
an obligation to notify affected states of actual or imminent
danger to the marine environment, to make contingency plans
for dealing with such dangers, to research, to study and to
exchange information and data in order to provide scientific
criteria for the development of rules, standards, procedures and
practices to reduce, prevent or control pollution.'
An accusation against a state for breaching its responsibility to the
ocean environment, or a breakdown in negotiations between two
or more states concerning appropriate resource management poli-
cies, activates the compulsory dispute settlement provisions.
E. Compulsory Dispute Settlement Procedures
Compulsory dispute settlement provisions form an integral
part of UNCLOS and prevent states from imposing unilateral
remedies against one another. 71 The key to UNCLOS is global
cooperation. Thus, to encourage cooperation and discourage
unilateral actions by one state against another, the participating
states agreed to submit to compulsory dispute settlement proce-
dures.
[A]ny law of the sea treaty is almost as easily susceptible of
unreasonable unilateral interpretation as are the principles of
67. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 61.
68. Id art. 64. Annex I of UNCLOS specifically lists highly migratory species, e.g.
species of tuna, marlins, swordfish, and dolphins.
69. Id art. 65. Article 65 also allows states to regulate the protection of marine
mammals more strictly than is provided for in UNCLOS. Cetaceans-marine mammals
of the order Cetacea-include whales, dolphins, and porpoises.
70. McConnell & Gold, supra note 5, at.91.
71. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 4.
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customary international law. This is particularly true when we
consider that the essential balance of critical portions of the
treaty, such as the economic zone, must rest upon impartial
interpretation of treaty provisions. One of the primary
motivations of [the U.S.] government in supporting the
negotiation of a new law of the sea treaty is that of making an
enduring contribution to a new structure for peaceful relations
among states. Accordingly, we must reiterate our view that a
system of peaceful and compulsory third-party settlement of
disputes is in the end perhaps the most significant justification
for the accommodations we are all being asked to make.'
To facilitate peaceful settlement of disputes among states,
UNCLOS requires states to submit to a settlement procedure if
requested to do so by any other party to the dispute.73 Any
decision rendered by the court or tribunal having jurisdiction74
"shall be final and shall be complied with by all the parties to the
dispute."75 The dispute settlement provisions in UNCLOS form
a sophisticated system of voluntary negotiation and compulsory
settlement procedures.76
The final wording of UNCLOS makes clear the individual
state's obligation to enact domestic legislation and to cooperate in
international agreements with a view toward protecting and
preserving marine resources. The new "constitution for the
oceans" recognizes the need to balance each state's sovereign right
to exploit the resources off its own coasts with the global need to
protect those resources for future generations.
72. I& at 44 (quoting John R. Stevenson, U.S. Representative, in a speech before the
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea at Caracas on July 11, 1974, in US. Defines
Position on 200-Mile Economic Zone at Conference on the Law of the Sea, 71 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 232, 235 (1974)).
73. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 286.
74. Article 287 gives a choice of the means for the settlement of disputes. The court
or tribunal chosen pursuant to Article 287 is granted jurisdiction to interpret the provisions
of UNCLOS in the dispute settlement. Id. arts. 287-88.
75. Id. art. 296.
76. A complex analysis of the UNCLOS compulsory dispute settlement procedures is
beyond the scope of this Comment. In general, Articles 279-85 provide standard dispute
resolution provisions and address the preferred method of dispute resolution procedures
through voluntary negotiation. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 49-50 (citing UNCLOS arts.
279-99). Articles 286-96 describe compulsory dispute resolution procedures when
voluntary measures fail. Id. Resolutions under compulsory procedures are binding on all
parties to the dispute. Id. Articles 297-99 address exceptions to the compulsory
provisions. I.
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Thus, states together have the duty to establish a
comprehensive plan that will harmonize effectively the needs of
each country's fishery management plans with the survival needs
of the oceans' ecosystems. The interdependence of species
requires that such a plan consider and care for all species' habitats
in establishing fishery management plans. Furthermore, the plan
must be flexible because each party contributing to UNCLOS is at
differing stages of development and has differing resource needs.
Lastly, to ensure the balance of all interests involved in this global
plan, states recognized the need to establish compulsory dispute
settlement procedures to prevent stronger states from acting uni-
laterally against weaker states.
IV. UNITED STATES OCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
Rather than implement a comprehensive national plan
designed to comply with the new global "legal order" establishing
marine protection, the United States maintains an ad hoc approach
to ocean environmental regulation. The United States reacts to
specific ecological problems when drafting domestic legislation and
when negotiating international agreements. Far from being
comprehensive, the U.S. scheme of ocean environmental protection
is "scattered," problem-specific, and often contradictory.77
The United States' desire to assert national sovereignty over
the ocean space is the basis for legislation regulating the use and
protection of ocean resources. 7 Its refusal to cooperate with
neighboring countries in negotiating ocean environmental policies
and access to ocean resources stems from an unwillingness to com-
promise that sovereignty.79
Moreover, individual state sovereignty over coastal territory
is a basic foundation of the U.S. political scheme. Additionally,
"federal versus state control over the newly acquired territorial sea
is one of the major controversies raised by the most recent legis-
lative proposals."' If individual U.S. states maintain control over
the territorial sea off their coasts, they will be responsible both
financially and legally for pollution control and cleanup in that
77. Belsky, supra note 8, at 431.
78. Remy, supra note 31, at 1211.
79. Belsky, supra note 8, at 451.
80. Remy, supra note 31, at 1211.
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area. Such piecemeal regulation could result in "varying degrees
of marine protection throughout the United States."8
The internal conflict over exercising state and national
sovereignty in the ocean territory has taken precedence over
international interests. As a result, U.S. policy is adverse to the
UNCLOS mandate to harmonize resource use and conservation
activities with other states to achieve uniformity in global environ-
mental legislation.8 Moreover, when problems arise, the United
States at times violates the UNCLOS spirit, and possibly its
directives, by failing to cooperate with other states in addressing
the problems. Rather, the United States elects to act unilaterally,
thereby violating rights delegated to other states under
UNCLOS.Y
3
The U.S. government's policy of pursuing a "quick fix" to
environmental issues by enacting ad hoc domestic legislation and
failing to negotiate comprehensive international agreements
conflicts with UNCLOS' goal of global cooperation. Moreover,
the U.S. unilateral actions often encourage other states to retaliate
by initiating their own trade restrictions.' 4 In the long run, the
U.S. policy undermines UNCLOS and the goal of global coop-
eration in marine resource protection.
A. Ad Hoc Regulation
Historically, the U.S. government only occasionally attempted
to coordinate ocean activities and resource management.85 More
often, the prevailing modus operandi included passing numerous,
singularly-focused, ocean-related laws and dividing administrative
responsibility of ocean matters among "more than twenty congres-
81. Id. at 1234.
82. Idt
83. As discussed supra Part ILI.B., states have the sovereign right under UNCLOS to
manage resources in their 200-nautical mile EEZ. In doing so, they must use the "best
scientific evidence available" for determining appropriate conservation measures.
UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 61. Additionally, other states must refrain from "unjustifiable
interference" with those states exercising such sovereign rights. McConnell & Gold, supra
note 5, at 90. Thus, when the United States imposes its own standards on those other
nations through unilateral actions, it directly violates UNCLOS. See infra discussion at
Part V.B.
84. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the
Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700,.722 (1992).
85. For an excellent chronology of the United States' regulation of the ocean, see
Belsky, supra note 8, at 434-48.
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sional subcommittees, twelve different Cabinet departments, eight
independent agencies, and numerous other sub-cabinet federal
agencies and advisory groups."8 6
By the end of the 1970s, the United States had passed
numerous legislative acts that focused on six goals of marine
regulation: "development of resources; protection of the ocean
space; management of resources; service to ocean users; promotion
of marine science, education and technology; and strategic and
military use of the oceans."'  No coordination of administration
or enunciated overall policy ever existed. As a result, the
programs were diverse and uncoordinated, and the goals and
procedures often contradicted one another.8
Statutes that illustrate this inconsistent and incomprehensive
ocean environmental program establish procedures for protecting
endangered species,' protecting marine mammals, ° maintaining
and managing commercial fishery habitats,91 and ocean resource
research and development. The United States protects and
manages marine resources on a species-by-species basis, without
considering the interdependence of species or the impact of
individual ocean activities on their ecosystem.'
B. Substantive US. Domestic Legislation
In drafting domestic legislation, Congress typically responds
only to environmental "emergencies" and public pressure. This
results in the ad hoc collection of laws described above. Statutes
addressing environmental concerns, therefore, are species-specific
or problem-specific and are not enforced on a wide scale. A brief
discussion of a few representative statutes follows.
86. Id. at 429.
87. Id. at 430.
88. Id.
89. The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992) [hereinafter ESA].
90. The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992) [hereinafter MMPAI.
91. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992) [hereinafter MFCMA].
92. Belsky, supra note 8, at 482.
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1. The Endangered Species Act
By its terms, the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") 9 broadly
protects endangered or threatened species. Rather than looking
at the global ecosystem to determine which species to protect and
where they should be protected, however, the courts have
interpreted the ESA to apply only to a limited geographical area
focusing on a particular species to be protected.' Moreover, in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,95 the Supreme Court virtually dis-
allowed any extraterritorial application of the ESA due to the
plaintiffs' inability to establish standing. The Supreme Court
stated "we shall assume for the sake of argument that ... certain
agency-funded projects threaten listed species .... [There are] no
facts, however, showing how damage to the species will produce
'imminent' injury."'  Consequently, U.S. agencies continue to
fund projects that threaten endangered species beyond U.S.
territory without the threat of legislative recourse.
Congress amended the ESA in 1989 to require the executive
branch to initiate negotiations with other states to protect en-
dangered sea turtles. The ESA prohibits the importation of
shrimp products from countries failing to require their shrimp
trawlers to install turtle excluder devices similar to those required
on U.S. vessels.9 The President's failure to certify to Congress
annually that the harvesting state has a regulatory program and an
incidental take rate comparable to the United States' automatically
triggers the embargo provisions.'
Harvesting states will be certified as having programs
comparable to the United States' if they: "(1) prohibit the
retention of incidentally caught sea turtles, (2) require that
comatose incidentally caught sea turtles be resuscitated, (3) require
all shrimp vessels to use turtle excluder devices (TEDs) at all times
93. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44.
94. Belsky, supra note 8, at 482.
95. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
96. I. at 563. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not demonstrate the
requisite concrete injury-in-fact to obtain standing to sue for extraterritorial enforcement
of the ESA.
97. 1989 Sea Turtle Conservation Amendments to the Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1537 (Supp. IV 1992).
98. Id.
99. 1d
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and to engage in a statistically reliable and verifiable scientific
monitoring program, and (4) employ a credible enforcement pro-
gram.""x  Thus, the United States unilaterally requires a state
with whom it has relations to adhere to U.S. standards rather than
negotiate an acceptable compromise.
2. Marine Mammal Protection Act
The primary purpose of the Marine Mammal Protection Act
("MMPA") 101 is to protect marine mammals against man's
activities by prohibiting the "taking" of marine mammals "to the
disadvantage of those species.'"' 2  "Taking" is defined as "to
harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture,
or kill any marine mammal. ' 'l( 3 Some criticize the MMPA,
however, as being poorly drafted, ambiguous,'O° and contradic-
tory to other federal statutes, such as the Magnuson Fisheries Con-
servation and Management Act ("MFCMA"). 105 The substance
of this criticism is that "many provisions of the MMPA threaten
achievement of [MFCMA] objectives ... [and the MMPA] con-
tains no provision for balancing the conflicting objectives of the
two statutory schemes."' 6
Some also criticize the MMPA as being protectionist °7
because it imposes a moratorium on the importation of tuna
products not caught in a manner consistent with U.S. stan-
dards." The rigid protection standards of the MMPA preclude
harmonization with other domestic and international legislation
that regulates commercial exploitation. Thus, the MMPA
standards contribute nothing towards establishing a comprehensive
and balanced approach to global marine resource management and
conservation.
100. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 24.
101. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421.
102. Id § 1373(a).
103. Id § 1362(13).
104. Terrin Child & Jeffrey T. Haley, The Marine Mammal Protection Act and the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act The Need For Balance, 56 WASH. L. REV. 397,
405 (1981).
105. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82.
106. Child & Haley, supra note 104, at 405. See infra discussion at Part V.A.
107. Id
108. MMPA § 1412.
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3. Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act
Similarly, the MFCMA 1°9  establishes an elaborate
mechanism for fishery management. The primary purpose of the
MFCMA is to "realize the maximum sustainable productivity from
fishery resources."' 10  Until 1987, however, fishery regulations
focused only on specific regions and particular species within those
regions, and not on the overall ecosystem and the fate of interde-
pendent species."'
The MFCMA also fails to recognize the need to negotiate
international agreements designed to regulate the taking of highly
migratory species, such as tuna, in order to preserve the species for
future generations.12 Nor does the MFCMA recognize a coastal
state's sovereignty in its 200-nautical mile EEZ as it relates to
highly migratory species."' In another example of unilaterally
imposed standards, the United States automatically prohibits all
tuna imports when the exporting country refuses to allow the
United States access to fish for tuna within its EEZ."14
Moreover, fishery plans and regulations do not provide for
curbing the effects of pollution and conflicting resource uses on the
marine environment."' Many different agencies implement
numerous regulatory and statutory controls to manage the
pollution resulting from these conflicting resource uses and other
adverse onshore activities."' With so many different interests
involved, harmonization and consistency is almost impossible.
Illustrative of the United States' failure to coordinate its fishery
and resource management plans with ocean pollution regulations
is the method by which it determines where and to whom to grant
leases for offshore oil and gas exploration.
109. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82.
110. Child & Haley, supra note 104, at 399.
111. Belsky, supra note 8, at 483.
112. Ted L. McDorman, The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Embargoes to Stop
Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. INT'L L & ECON.
477, 501 (1991).
113. Id.
114. Id at 502.
115. Belsky, supra note 8, at 484.
116. Id
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4. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Pollution and resource management statutes generally call for
a "balancing" of interests when ruling on a proposal that affects
the environment. For example, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act ("OCSA") 117 balances the need to protect the marine en-
vironment against increasing energy needs. Specifically, the statute
requires the Department of the Interior to prepare and periodical-
ly revise a leasing plan that balances the potential for adverse
environmental impact with the potential for the discovery of oil
and gas."'
The OCSA leasing policy exemplifies the inadequacy of the
U.S. ocean policy. The statute mandates that the Department of
the Interior "consider" the comments of others and the impact of
a proposal on the environment but does not force it to take any
action or refuse any leases due to adverse effects on the envi-
ronment." 9 Before refusing a lease, the government must find
an "unreasonable risk" to the fisheries. In fact, the Secretary of
the Interior has interpreted the OCSA "balancing requirement" to
operate as a mandate for expediting offshore leasing and commer-
cial exploitation rather than for environmental protection."2
The statutes addressed above represent a sampling of the
myriad of U.S. legislation regulating resource use and conservation
in the marine environment."' Such ad hoe regulation leads to
ambiguity and conflict among the statutes rather than coordination
toward a single goal. As a result, the overall U.S. ocean policy, as
applied, conflicts with the UNCLOS mandates of implementing a
comprehensive national plan for conservation and resource
management and coordinating that plan on a global level.
V. U.S. DOMESTIC LEGISLATION COMPARED TO UNCLOS:
CONFLICTS AND SHORTCOMINGS
Examples of the tensions between U.S. regulations and
UNCLOS directives and goals follow. One such tension concerns
117. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56
(1986).
118. Id § 1344(a)(3).
119. Belsky, supra note 8, at 485.
120. Id at 487.
121. Rafterman, supra note 52, at 92.
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the UNCLOS requirement of a comprehensive national plan for
resource conservation and management and the U.S. practice of ad
hoc legislation. Another major source of tension between U.S.
regulations and UNCLOS directives concerns the United States'
imposition of unilateral trade sanctions against other states in
order to enforce U.S. standards of operation.
A. Failure to Adopt a Comprehensive National Plan
The conservation provisions in the ESA, to date, have been
applied to a limited geographical area and to particular species in
that area.'2 According to UNCLOS, international law mandates
globally-focused conservation that considers the ecosystem as a
whole rather than piecemeal regulation. Moreover, contradictions
inherent in the application of such piecemeal legislation undermine
the implementation of a comprehensive national plan, as required
by UNCLOS.
The interaction between the MMPA and the MFCMA
provides an example of such contradiction and how it frustrates
the comprehensive national plan required under UNCLOS.
Different Congresses enacted the MMPA and the MFCMA, and
the statutes "reflect disparate influences in their purposes and
goals, some of which verge on mutual exclusivity."" Such
differences can have a dramatic impact on the marine environment
due to the interdependence of the species affected by the acts.
The MFCMA focuses on commercial exploitation of fisheries.
The MMvPA, however, rigidly protects marine mammals from
harm, with almost no exception for the needs of commercial fish-
eries.124  Thus, "[i]t is possible that any harvest of fish that
detrimentally affects marine mammals as described [such as
reducing sources of food or degrading the habitat] could be found
by a court to constitute a 'taking' for purposes of the MNIMPA."'
Species are necessarily interdependent in the ecosystem, so
rational management of that ecosystem requires that regulations
be coordinated carefully to achieve a common purpose. Such is
the express mandate of the new international law under
122. See supra Part IV.B.1.
123. Child & Haley, supra note 104, at 398.
124. Id. at 401.
125. i& at 407.
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UNCLOS. 26 The U.S. system of resource management, howev-
er, sharply deviates from that mandate.
B. Violations of the UNCLOS Requirement of Global
Cooperation
A major source of tension between U.S. regulations and
UNCLOS directives concerns the United States' imposition of
unilateral trade sanctions against other states in order to enforce
U.S. standards of operation. Such unilateral actions violate
international law by directly interfering with a sovereign's exclusive
right to regulate activities in its own territory.127 A state may
trigger U.S. trade sanctions if it fails to comply with U.S. domestic
conservation standards, such as the MMPA'2 or the 1989 Sea
Turtle Conservation Amendments to the ESA.129  As discussed
above, the imposition of trade sanctions under these laws depends
upon whether a foreign state implements conservation or operating
standards comparable to those adopted in the United States for
protecting marine mammals and sea turtles."3
The international community is hostile toward these laws
because trade-sanction decisions are based solely on U.S. domestic
environmental standards and contain no exceptions for internation-
ally agreed upon standards."' Additionally, "these statutes have
been deemed protectionist by many nations because they serve to
protect U.S. fishermen from foreign competition by equalizing
costs associated with environmental protection."1
Congress enacted trade-sanction provisions in the MMPA to
respond to public outcry about the alarming rate of dolphin
mortality in the tuna industry." The provisions establish import
bans on tuna obtained through purse seine fishing methods. To
export tuna to the United States, a country must adhere to the
following: (1) the foreign state must demonstrate that it has
126. See supra Part IIl.
127. See supra discussion at Part M.B.
128. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421.
129. 16 U.S.C. § 1537.
130. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 20.
131. Id.
132. Id
133. McDorman, supra note 112, at 492. Data before Congress indicated that in 1987,
foreign fishing fleets using purse seine methods were responsible for more than eighty
percent of the dolphins killed, a number in excess of 103,000 for the year. Id at 493.
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established the same or similar restrictions on its fishermen as the
U.S. restrictions on the incidental killing of marine mammals; and
(2) within sixty days of a U.S. ban, any intermediary country must
submit proof that it will not be exporting to the United States any
of the restricted tuna caught in a nonconforming country."3
In Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher,'35 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Department of the
Interior has limited discretionary authority under the MMPA. The
Department of the Interior must impose an embargo on all yellow-
fin tuna and tuna products from all states whose fishing practices
fail to conform to U.S. standards.'36 The embargo cannot be
lifted until the Secretary of Commerce certifies that each state's
incidental kill rate of dolphins is comparable to the U.S. rate
according to the certification standards set forth in the Act.137
Provisions for the protection of endangered sea turtles for
automatic embargoes are almost identical to those in the
MMPA.'38 Both statutes, along with many other U.S. fisheries
statutes with trade-related components, may affect the rights and
obligations of states under UNCLOS and, thereby, trigger its
compulsory dispute settlement provisions. "The purpose of the
trade embargo provisions of the [MMPA], the Sea Turtle Conser-
vation Amendments of 1989, . . and comparable U.S. statutes is
to force foreign nations to alter their fisheries conservation and
management practices so that they comply with standards deemed
adequate by the United States.""3 The imposition of trade
sanctions is automatic regardless of whether the noncomplying
practice occurs on the high seas, in a coastal state's own EEZ, in
its own territorial sea, or in internal waters.Y Moreover, unilat-
eral U.S. trade sanctions may be imposed even if a foreign state's
practices comply with its own domestic laws, international
agreements, or existing international law.
134. Rafterman, supra note 52, at 84.
135. 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
136. Id. at 1451.
137. Id
138. See supra discussion at Part IV.B.1.
139. McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 28.
140. Id
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VI. CONCLUSION
UNCLOS is now international law. As such, parties are
bound by the obligations and duties imposed by the "constitution
for the oceans." Arguably, even states that have not formally
ratified the treaty are bound due to its status as customary
international law.
UNCLOS requires states to cooperate globally to "protect and
preserve the marine environment." As a compromise package,
UNCLOS carefully balances the need for states to maintain
sovereignty over their territorial waters and EEZs with the global
need to manage effectively the ocean ecosystem. Because such
careful balancing is necessary to preserve global harmony and
provide effective resource management, the participants in
UNCLOS agreed to rigid dispute settlement procedures that are
both compulsory and binding.
UNCLOS resulted from a long, arduous negotiation, in which
the parties present compromised on numerous policies to achieve
a global balance. The United States played a major role in the
negotiations and greatly influenced the resulting policies.
Once the package was complete, however, the United States
decided not to sign, but to take advantage of the negotiated
compromises. The United States announced that it would be
bound by and would hold other states responsible for certain
portions of the treaty it viewed as customary international law.
The United States would not treat as binding, however, those
portions with which it disagreed.
Since President Reagan's announcement that the United
States would adhere to the terms of UNCLOS, the United States
has made little change in its policy of ad hoc regulation of marine
issues. As a result of its ad hoc decision-making and "knee-jerk"
responses to immediately perceived problems in the ocean
environment, the United States has failed to create a comprehen-
sive national plan. The U.S. ocean legislation fails to balance the
needs of the ocean ecosystem with the needs of U.S. commercial
fisheries and, therefore, conflicts with the express provisions of
UNCLOS.
Moreover, the United States explicitly violates UNCLOS by
unilaterally imposing its policies on those states it can control
through strong-arm trade sanctions rather than recognizing and
respecting each state's sovereign right to manage its own ocean
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space. Rather than cooperating in compromise agreements
designed to achieve a plan benefitting each country involved, the
United States' first response to a state with practices different from
its own is to impose trade sanctions.
To comply with international law and to achieve the vision
aspired to by UNCLOS, therefore, the United States must now
revisit its approach to ocean policy-making and modify it to
achieve harmony and cohesion. The United States must combine
the myriad of scattered, conflicting legislation into one package de-
signed to manage ocean resources while considering the interde-
pendence of species and habitats. The United States also must
cooperate globally, rather than act unilaterally, to achieve and not
impede the goal of world environmental protection.
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